Of Dogs and Pigs

In 2007, Atlanta Falcons quarterback Michael Vick was convicted of federal dogfighting charges. There was public outrage when the gory details of the dogfighting ring were revealed, including dogs that had been electrocuted, drowned, and hung. Vick went on to serve 23 months in federal prison and 3 years probation for his role. He was also suspended from the NFL and forced to pay back a portion of his earnings to the team. Vick’s actions were rightfully condemned by society. What he did was cruel and sickening. But the case also highlighted a massive inconsistency in the way most people think about animals.

The number of animals raised for human consumption each year is in the billions. Though some of these animals are given pleasant lives and painless deaths, most of them are raised on factory farms. The treatment of animals on factory farms is horrific. It is typical for them to be confined so tightly that they can barely move. Many breeding sows are unable even to turn around for long periods of time. Chickens routinely have their beaks trimmed with a hot blade, and cattle and pigs often have their tails cut off without anesthesia. The lives of animals on factory farms are arguably just as miserable as those of Michael Vick’s dogs. Yet relatively few people express any concerns about this. It is perfectly legal and accepted by society.

What, then, is so special about dogs? I don’t mean to suggest that there aren’t good reasons for caring more about members of some species over others. I would be much more concerned for the well being of a chimpanzee than say, a sponge. But I do question whether there is any rational basis for granting dogs in particular an elevated moral status and indeed, greater legal protection than other species with similar mental capacities.

Any moral philosopher knows that if what Michael Vick did was wrong but factory farming is not, then there must be some morally relevant distinction between the two. Is the fact that Vick abused dogs and not cows, pigs, or chickens a morally relevant factor? I find this to be a dubious claim. In our society dogs are viewed as pet animals, and many people even consider dogs to be members of their families. On the other hand, few people regularly come into contact with farm animals unless they are farmers. So it is certainly true that we are more familiar with dogs than other species. But so what? It would be a weak ethical principle to state “It is wrong to deliberately abuse a being unless it is a type of being with which I am not very familiar.” After all, not all cultures do consider dogs to be pet animals. In many East Asian countries, dog meat is a part of the traditional cuisine. How could you convince someone from such a culture that what Michael Vick did was wrong if that was the ethical principle you were following? It would be absurd to expect such a person to be persuaded by the fact that you personally are familiar with dogs.

But perhaps there is some other distinction between dogfighting and factory farming which is morally relevant. In Michael Vick’s case, he actually derived pleasure from the infliction of suffering itself, whereas the suffering inflicted in factory farms is just a side effect of the ultimate goal, which is to produce cheap meat. In other words, Michael Vick intended to cause suffering, but factory farm workers only cause suffering because that happens to be a by-product of producing cheap meat. This distinction does not stand up to much scrutiny. Drunk drivers do not intend to cause accidents; they are just a side effect of drinking alcohol. But we still hold drunk drivers responsible for causing accidents.

Finally, you may have conceded that factory farming is morally wrong, but since you are not a factory farm worker, you are off the hook. Michael Vick was directly involved in running the dogfighting ring, so he should be prosecuted for it, but since you personally have never directly abused an animal, you have done nothing wrong. Not so fast. If somebody hires a hitman to commit a murder for him, he is still just as responsible as the hitman himself. It doesn’t matter that the act of hiring the hitman only indirectly led to a murder. The same is true for factory farms. When you purchase meat from factory farms, you are increasing the demand for their meat, and therefore encouraging them to continue producing it. You are essentially paying somebody else to do the dirty work for you, just like the person who hires a hitman. Please note, however, that I am not necessarily equating all meat eaters to murderers; I am merely using an analogy to show why the directness of the consequences of an action is not morally relevant.

What is morally relevant is the capacity to suffer. If a being can suffer, then there can be no justification for not taking its suffering into consideration when we make ethical judgments. There is no scientific basis for believing that dogs can suffer any more than farm animals can. Therefore, I believe it is hypocritical to condemn Michael Vick while continuing to purchase meat from factory farms. Ethical vegetarians are often perceived as kooky, hippy animal lovers. I wish to dispel that reputation. The moral status of animals is a legitimate intellectual concern. After all, lest we forget the lesson Darwin taught us more than a century and a half ago, we ARE animals!